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Abstract
Dependability is a qualitative term referring to a system’s ability to meet its service require-
ments in the presence of faults. The types and number of faults covered by a system play a
primary role in determining the level of dependability which that system can potentially provide.
Given the variety and multiplicity of fault types, to simplify the design process, the system al-
gorithm design often focuses on speci.c fault types, resulting in either over-optimistic (all fault
permanent) or over-pessimistic (all faults malicious) dependable system designs.
A more practical and realistic approach is to recognize that faults of varied severity
levels and of di0ering occurrence probabilities may appear as combinations rather than the as-
sumed single fault type occurrences. The ability to allow the user to select=customize a particular
combination of fault types of varied severity characterizes the proposed customizable fault=error
model (CFEM). The CFEM organizes diverse fault categories into a cohesive framework by
classifying faults according to the e0ect they have on the required system services rather than
by targeting the source of the fault condition. In this paper, we develop (a) the complete frame-
work for the CFEM fault classi.cation, (b) the voting functions applicable under the CFEM,
and (c) the fundamental distributed services of consensus and convergence under the CFEM on
which dependable distributed functionality can be supported. c© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All
rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Dependability is a qualitative term describing the con.dence that can be placed
in a computing system’s ability to deliver the expected service, even in the presence
of faults [10], where the term expected service also includes the notion of timeliness.
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Dependability comprises the issues and techniques most commonly used to identify,
implement, and measure system fault-tolerance and real-time performance.
Typically, a fault is de.ned as an anomalous physical condition, the identi.ed or
hypothesized cause of an error, which may eventually lead to a loss of service i.e.,
failure. An error is the manifestation of a fault, an undesired state either at the boundary
or at an internal point in the system or process. A failure is the inability of the system
or component to provide the speci.ed service caused by an error. The faults tolerated
by a system play a primary role in the level of dependability that a system can achieve,
as quanti.ed, for example, by the reliability metric. Also, the e0ectiveness of a fault-
tolerance method always relies on the realism and accuracy of the assumed underlying
fault and error models.
The fault models used in designing and analyzing dependable distributed systems
typically make simplifying assumptions about the nature of faults in the system. Often,
the fault tolerance algorithms used by a system treat all faults identically, ignoring the
e0ects of any fault types the algorithm is not designed to distinguish or tolerate. Such
overly optimistic single fault-type models assume a .xed number of benign permanent
faults and perfect fault coverage. Or, the system model employs complex protocols that
assume all faults to be malicious, even though only a small portion of the faults may
actually require such protection. These more pessimistic Byzantine models assume all
faults to be arbitrary. By distinguishing between di0erent fault types and by considering
di0ering probabilities of occurrence for each fault type, we can develop more realistic
system models to design algorithms capable of handling the various fault types. In
this paper, we utilize the rationale of [2, 14, 16, 18, 20], and develop the customizable
fault=error model (CFEM), which considers mixed fault types (as selected=customized
by the user) along with the algorithms needed to tolerate such faults.
Under the CFEM, the set of all faults is partitioned into three disjoint classes based
on fault e0ects: non-malicious, malicious symmetric, and malicious asymmetric. Then,
the class of algorithm required to detect or mask the subset of faults that is assumed
to occur is indicated as a function of the fault type. This matching of fault type to
algorithm is important in ensuring adequate, yet cost-e0ective, system fault coverage.
If the fault tolerance techniques implemented do not support segregation and handling
of mixed faults, then the CFEM reverts to the single fault-type models, with no im-
provement. Thus, existing fault tolerance methods must be extended to properly utilize
the proposed CFEM. The main di0erence between our CFEM-based algorithms and
existing fault models based algorithms is our use of dynamic fault tolerance, based
on the ability to detect certain types of faults locally. We combine the bene.ts of the
models assuming perfect fault detection with the increased coverage of the more real-
istic models. An important contribution is the development of algorithms that achieve
consensus (exact agreement) and convergence (approximate agreement) without the
classically required condition that all participants have the same number of values on
which to vote.
The CFEM provides a framework which can be used to enhance the dependability
of processes and systems. The CFEM philosophy takes a practical view of faults and
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their e0ects on system operations, recognizing that a system cannot tolerate an unlimited
set of faults, and that the fault tolerance techniques implemented in a system play a
large role in determining the covered fault-e0ects. Di0erences in the probabilities of
occurrence of di0erent faults, the severity of their e0ects, and the number of faulty
units which can be tolerated during di0erent phases of system operation are exploited to
improve the coverage provided by CFEM. The classical single fault-type instantiation
is replaced by a fault-tuple, chosen (or customized) by the user, representing the set
of fault-e0ects of varied severity which may exist concurrently in the system, and are
chosen to be protected against. The fault resiliency of critical system functions such
as synchronization, data voting, and other consensus-based operations is also improved
through the consideration of CFEM.
1.1. Contributions
The contributions of this paper are developed over the following sections. In
Section 2, we present the distributed system models, review existing fault taxonomies,
and present the basis for the CFEM based fault=error classi.cation. Sections 3 and
4 focus on developing the theoretical framework to support CFEM. Section 3 devel-
ops the varied fault scenarios valid under CFEM and also presents an analysis of the
CFEM’s enhanced fault handling capabilities as compared to classical fault models. In
Section 4, the requisite fault-tolerant voting functions supporting CFEM are developed.
In Section 5, we present the formal framework and analysis in CFEM’s providing the
fundamental distributed services of consensus and convergence. We summarize and
discuss the impact of our contributions in Section 6.
2. Fault=error models in distributed systems
System models
For simplicity of discussion, we adopt a generalized system model, although the CFEM
and the other fault models are applicable to a variety of system models such as syn-
chronous, asynchronous, full=partial connectivity, etc. A system consists of a set of
nodes. Nodes communicate by exchanging information (messages) across links, with
a bounded delay assumed for message generation, delivery and processing. We use
the terms “system”, “nodes”, “links”, and “messages” in an abstract sense, because
some type of information exchange often exists between a node and its components,
or between a process and its subprocesses.
We assume a fully connected system consisting of nodes which communicate using
synchronous message passing, with an upper bound on the time required for a node
to generate and send a message. Individual nodes make decisions and compute values
based on information received in messages from other nodes. The status of a node,
faulty or good, is discerned by other nodes through the contents of messages originating
from the target node, or through the absence of an expected message from that node,
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i.e., nodes monitor the messages from other nodes to infer the presence of a fault-e0ect.
As in [18, 9], a non-faulty node can always identify the sender of a message it receives
and can detect the absence of an expected message. The system fails when consistent
decisions or computations across the system are no longer possible.
In our assumed system model, the “fault Koor” is at the node level. That is, regardless
of how many failed components exist in a given node, only the node’s fault status,
as viewed by other nodes, is of interest in determining the system fault resiliency. 3
Since the system design objective is to provide continual correct service, we focus
on faults which may a0ect distributed computation of critical system functions. As
described in subsequent sections, the CFEM framework is based on classi.cation of
faults based on each node’s analysis of inter-node communications. Membership in
a fault-e0ect class is determined by the system topology and by the fault tolerance
methods implemented in a speci.c system. This linking of fault-e0ects to the methods
implemented (or required) to tolerate them is unique to the CFEM. As we are interested
in developing comprehensive fault classi.cations, we start by .rst reviewing existing
classi.cations.
2.1. Existing fault classi5cations
A fault is classically de.ned as the cause, real or perceived, of errors which can lead
to failure. Much e0ort has been expended and many taxonomies have been proposed
to capture the important attributes of faults. Laprie [10] classi.es faults according to
the attributes of nature (accidental or intentional); cause (physical or human-made);
location (internal or external); phase of creation (design or operational); and persis-
tence (permanent or temporary). The fault attributes of Laprie have been augmented
to include activity (active or dormant) and value (stationary, non-stationary) [1]. This
taxonomy is useful in identifying faults to be removed during the design and testing
process.
While these classi.cations and attributes are important and commonly used in the
literature, they do not provide all the information about faults that is required by the
designers or assessors of a system. They provide insuMcient indication of the types of
faults that can occur in a given system, or how to avoid, detect, or tolerate the faults.
It is assumed that the classes within each attribute are disjoint; so, for a given attribute,
a speci.c fault in a speci5c system can belong to exactly one class. However, if the
same type of fault occurs in two di0erent systems, it is possible for the fault to be
classi.ed di0erently in the two systems with respect to a given attribute. Such fault
classi.cation ambiguity can arise because the systems in which the fault occurs can
have vastly di0erent requirements. For example, a fault lasting a few seconds might
be suMcient for a fault handler in one system to diagnose a permanent fault and a
temporary fault in another. Di0erences can also occur as per the location of the fault
3 Link failures are not directly addressed in this model, but are ascribed to the perceived sender of the
message. However, the fault Koor could be extended to node and link failures if desired.
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Fig. 1. Onion fault model.
in the systems, how long the fault is active relative to the time scale (mission time)
for each system, the technology used to construct each system, the assumed system
environment, and other related factors.
A di0erent approach based on the use of failure semantics for dependable systems
with real-time constraints and responsive systems [13] is the onion model [5, 3]. Fig. 1,
taken from [5], shows the relationships among the .ve potential failure modes of the
onion model, given in increasing order of severity: fail-stop, crash, omission, timing and
arbitrary. Under the fail-stop assumption, a component 4 fails by ceasing execution; no
incorrect state transition occurs, and all other good components can detect this failure.
A crash or fail-silent mode is identical to fail-stop, except that detection by all good
components is not guaranteed. An omission mode occurs when a component fails to
respond to an input, perhaps undetectably to some components. A functionally correct,
but untimely response corresponds to a timing fault. Any other mode of behavior
is classi.ed as an arbitrary fault. The more restricted the assumed fault mode, the
stronger the assumed failure semantics. Thus, weak failure semantics correspond to
little restriction of behavior of a faulty component. Note that in Fig. 1, the containment
relationship among di0erent classes is such that limiting failure semantics of a host to,
say, timing, means that the host can fail in any of the modes subsumed: fail-stop, crash,
or omission. The onion fault model fails to capture the notion of a system consisting
of nodes, and does not aid in ensuring that correct system operations are sustained
in the presence of a node failure. The focus of this model on abstract and high level
faults limits its coverage of data faults. It is to address such limitations of the existing
fault models that the CFEM approach is proposed.
2.2. The customizable fault=error model taxonomy
The CFEM is a model that focuses on runtime fault-e0ects and the methods associ-
ated with tolerating them. We do not attempt to deal with all possible fault
4 In this context, the term component may refer to hardware, software, or a combination of the two.
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Fig. 2. CFEM fault classi.cation basis.
occurrences speci.cally but rather to form classes determined by the potential fault-
e0ects. Faults classi.ed using other taxonomies can be mapped into the classes of
the CFEM framework. The CFEM fault classes are determined by the fault-tolerance
techniques (detection and masking) implemented in the system and the system topology.
Under the CFEM, node faults are classi.ed according to the ability of the system to
tolerate their e0ects. At the highest level, the set of all faults is partitioned into tolerable
and intolerable faults according to their e0ects.
Intolerable fault-e7ects are faults whose e0ects cannot be detected, masked, or oth-
erwise tolerated by the system quickly enough to prevent them from causing a loss of
service or improper service with consequences greatly exceeding the bene.ts of proper
system service. Design faults, generic faults, common mode faults, physical damage
faults and other catastrophic faults that immediately render much of a system useless
would be categorized as intolerable. In some applications, it may be necessary to dis-
tinguish among di0erent types of intolerable faults. Some fault e0ects are intolerable
because no technique could possibly mask or detect them; faults that destroy substantial
portions of the system fall into this category. Other fault-e0ects are intolerable because
they are not covered by design or attrition. That is, the system fault model incorrectly
assumes that such faults will not occur and the chosen system fault handling functions
do not cover that type of fault; or, an otherwise covered fault is not handled because
not enough system resources are available to mask or detect it. Since it is impossi-
ble to model or predict the occurrence of such faults, perfect fault coverage to a few
non-coincident, non-catastrophic faults is assumed, with the probability of catastrophic
faults assumed to be very small.
Tolerable fault e7ects, or covered fault-e0ects are the one of direct interest to us in
establishing the CFEM. We .rst present the detection setup in a node on which CFEM
is based. As shown in Fig. 2, when an error from a faulty node is detected by some
non-faulty node, the sending node is identi.ed locally as potentially benign. All good
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Fig. 3. CFEM fault space (communication symmetry vs. detectability).
nodes must agree on this local judgment for the fault e0ects to be classi.ed as benign.
The instantaneous classi.cation of all faults requires the globally omniscient view in
Fig. 2. In practice, distributed information distribution and dissemination is used to
approximate the global view in the presence of potentially malicious faults [20, 21].
In the CFEM, all fault classi.cation is based on (1) local-classi5cation of fault-e0ects
to the extent permitted by the fault-detection mechanisms built in at the node level,
and (2) global-classi5cation based on nodes exchanging their local-classi.cation with
other system nodes to develop a global opinion on the fault-e0ect. We now describe
in greater detail the rationale behind the individual classi.cations.
The CFEM classi.cation [20] begins with the examination of the possible fault states
created by the dispersal of information. In the abstract, we can assume that when a
node transmits information, two general cases are possible as illustrated in Fig. 3:
(a) all receivers obtain the same information i.e., messj (symmetric dispersal), or (b)
receivers obtain di0erent information i.e., messj and mess′j (asymmetric dispersal). This
abstraction is suMcient since we are primarily concerned with maintaining consistency
and these two possibilities reKect whether it is preserved or not.
The second aspect of CFEM is based on the extent of the fault-e0ect as created by
the faulty source and the way in which it has propagated its e0ects. If an individual
node is suMcient to detect the error from an incoming message, we classify this case
as a benign sender fault since the fault-e0ect is locally detectable at the receiver.
On the other hand, there are situations that require multiple nodes to exchange their
syndrome information with each other in order to provide accurate diagnosis, i.e.,
globally detectable. For these cases, the values in a message appear to be plausible
locally at a node; however, they can only be veri.ed with a multiple exchange of
information. After the exchange is completed, the plausible value may be determined
to be value-faulty.
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As an example, consider the acceptable range of the value contained in a message
to be [0; 100], with the expected correct value of 50 in a message. A node accepts a
message without registering any fault as long as the value is within [0,100]. If a faulty
node sends values 30 and 70 as values in the messages (instead of the correct value
of 50) to the other two nodes, both of these messages are within the acceptable range
[0; 100], thus these erroneous values are not locally detectable at the receiving nodes.
Only when the two receiving nodes exchange (or distribute) their received message
values of 30 and 70, respectively with each other, does the asymmetric nature of the
faulty values comes across i.e., global detectability of value-faults.
Fig. 3 summarizes the speci.c cases covered by the CFEM. The vertical axis reKects
the possibilities for information dispersal and the horizontal axis represents the types
of detectability. The fault-e0ects are represented by the table entries and consists of
two major types covered in each vertical column: benign and value faults. The benign
faults can be dispersed in a symmetric or asymmetric manner; however, these faults
are detectable by all non-faulty nodes with fault detection mechanisms implemented
locally. Any detectable fault in a message will result in the sender being classi.ed as
locally benign faulty, B, by the receiver. The rightmost vertical column of the table
covers value faults, which are the locally undetectable class of faults. Messages which
pass all data validity and range deviance checks, but provide a valid but incorrect
value constitute value faults. Since the e0ect of these faults are dependent on the type
of information dispersal, we have the sub-cases of symmetric-value faults, S, and
asymmetric-value faults, A. The asymmetric-value fault is equivalent to the case of a
Byzantine fault and is also referred to as the arbitrary fault case. The set of all tolerable
faults, F , can be written as the union of three disjoint sets, giving B∪S∪A, with
the symbols corresponding respectively to benign, symmetric and asymmetric malicious
faults. To accurately represent the single fault-type models, the set of benign faults,
B, can be split into two disjoint subsets: benign symmetric faults (BS), and benign
asymmetric faults (BA). 5
The CFEM reKects the behavior of the system in the presence of di0erent node
faults when used in the system analysis phases, with each fault type mapped into one
of the four disjoint classes. A fault e7ect classi5cation captures the set of fault e0ects
handled by the fault tolerance techniques implemented in the system. In the system
design phase, the CFEM thus facilitates the selection of the fault tolerance methods to
be used in the system. The potential fault e7ect classes are derived from subsequent
repartitionings of the total fault set, achieved by changing the set of fault detection
and masking methods implemented in the system. The process of mapping a speci.c
fault into a distinctive fault-e0ects category is termed as fault transformation, and it
can enhance the system fault coverage by transforming initially intolerable faults into
tolerable faults, or arbitrary faults into benign faults. The fault e0ect classi.cation is
5 While crash faults are most often benign symmetric, with all non-faulty nodes able to detect that a node
has crashed, range faults can be either symmetric or asymmetric. So, they are not included explicitly in this
partitioning, but are restored when all benign faults are considered as a single class.
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then re-evaluated following the implementation of additional fault detection or masking
techniques.
As mentioned earlier, the classi.cation of non-catastrophic faults in the CFEM is a
function of the fault tolerance techniques implemented in the system. If suMcient fault
coverage and system reliability cannot be demonstrated by a given design, additional
fault tolerance techniques can be used to increase the covered fault set or system
reliability. For example, in a simplex system with no node or information redundancy,
all faults are intolerable=undetectable. If information redundancy in the form of error
detection and correction codes is used, then formerly intolerable=undetectable faults
that cause errors which can be masked or detected by these coding procedures are
transformed into benign faults.
Similar transformations are also possible among the more severe fault types. For
example, in a system of N nodes in which the hybrid symmetric scenario applies,
suppose that the only benign faults which can be detected are checksum and missing
messages. If a faulty node sends di0erent values to di0erent nodes, where each value
is out of the range of correct values, the initial system may fail due to an unaccounted
asymmetric value fault, which is a catastrophic fault. However, if a range check is
added to the fault detection techniques implemented in the node, that potentially un-
accounted catastrophic fault is converted to a benign fault. Thus, the covered fault set
for any of the scenarios can often be extended by implementing additional fault de-
tection methods which transform potentially catastrophic faults into benign ones. The
addition of extra system nodes can also be used to transform some catastrophic faults
into hybrid faults, in the case where the system fails due to resource exhaustion. The
bene.ts of fault transformation are addressed in further detail in the next section.
3. CFEM: implications and comparisons with classical xed severity fault models
We demonstrate the bene.ts of the CFEM approach by examining possible solutions
to a given design problem. We will present results for the general case, and then apply
them to an example case. As discussed in the previous section, a system using only
active redundancy techniques is capable of detecting benign faults from set B.
However, if an (unprotected) malicious value fault from set A∪S occurs, system
failure is likely to occur. When only non-iterative passive redundancy techniques, such
as majority or fault-tolerant midpoint votes, are implemented, symmetric faults from
the set S=BS ∪S are masked, but the occurrence of asymmetric faults from set
A=BA ∪A can cause the system to fail. The use of interactive consistency and
interactive convergence algorithms ensures all non-catastrophic fault types are covered,
since such algorithms mask arbitrary faults, i.e. all faults in F .
We continue to assume a synchronous message passing system of N identical com-
ponents or processes, called nodes, where the only evidence of a faulty node is an
error in a message from that node. A good node is expected to collect information
from other nodes and to arrive at a local decision that is consistent with the decisions
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of all other good nodes. A good node may also need to compute a local value within
a prespeci.ed range of the values of other good nodes. We address the issue of usage
of the consistent local values computed by good nodes in the next section.
Based on the assumed system fault model, the fault handling techniques implemented
in the system, and the resulting fault resiliency, we derive characteristics of the sys-
tem consensus operations. We discuss variations in the assumed fault models, coverage
parameters, and the fault resiliency. We assume a system of N nodes capable of sus-
taining f faults. The number of faults, f, can be written as f=fA +fB +fS where
fA is the number of faults from A, fS is the number of faults from S, and fB is
the number of faults from B; any of these parameters can be 5xed at zero by the
assumed system fault model.
A system required to be Fail-Op=Fail-Op=Fail-Safe, should remain operational(Op)
after two non-coincident faults of any type, and should degrade to a prede.ned safe
state following the third fault. Implicit in this speci.cation is that the fourth fault,
regardless of its scope, symmetry, or malice, leads to immediate system failure. While
“perfect fault coverage” refers to coverage of non-catastrophic or hybrid faults, if a
working (not failed) system contains multiple faulty nodes, the next fault might cause
system failure, irrespective of the e0ects it might have had in a system with fewer faulty
nodes. So, the class of catastrophic faults also includes faults which cause system failure
by violating the system fault resiliency. The hybrid fault model scenarios provide limits
on the number and types of faults that can be tolerated by a given node set according
to the fault tolerance techniques implemented in the system. As mentioned earlier, if
the available resources are not adequate to meet the system dependability requirements,
additional fault tolerance techniques and resources can be used to transform faults from
one class of the CFEM to another, potentially improving the system reliability and fault
coverage.
3.1. CFEM and classical fault models: fault scenarios, fault coverage and fault
resiliency comparisons
Many system design approaches assume perfect coverage for a given fault set. Then,
an algorithm is chosen which tolerates the worst-case faults in that set. As we shall
see, this results in either overly optimistic or pessimistic models when the perfect fault
assumption is relaxed, as it must be when the system implementation is completed.
Since anecdotal evidence suggests that faults in B are the most common, followed by
faults in S and A, respectively, the fault assumptions made in a given system can
be used to evaluate the impact of implementing the di0erent CFEM fault scenarios
presented below.
The key to the usage of the CFEM is to be able to associate the proper CFEM based
algorithm with the assumed system or node fault set. For example, if the node fault
set to be covered contains asymmetric faults, then a CFEM consensus or convergence
algorithm should be implemented. The fault tolerance algorithms required by the CFEM
along with the supporting voting functions are developed in Sections 4 and 5. We do
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emphasize that the main di0erence between these scenarios and the single fault-type
models is their treatment of benign faults. Unlike earlier models, the CFEM and its
algorithms take advantage of a good node’s ability to recognize missing or garbled
messages, message tampering and other crash or range faulty behavior. The notation
CFEMX is used to indicate that the scenario assumes that the worst case faults are in
set X, where X∈{B;S;A}. The total number of faults which can occur in the system
simultaneously is given by f=fA + fS + fB. The faults could have been sequential,
near coincident, or coincident, but under static redundancy management, all the faulty
nodes remain in the system. For the system to maintain correct operation, the number
of nodes, N , and the number of faults f, must satisfy the conditions speci.ed in the
scenario below that corresponds to the system implementation. If the number of faults
exceeds the limit of f, then the fault scenario in which f is exceeded is a catastrophic
fault. Thus, the set of catastrophic faults includes those faults that cause system failure
because they exceed the fault resiliency of the system.
We next present a brief overview of the classical single fault-type model scenarios,
and the CFEM scenarios which supersede them. We present the resiliency of these
scenarios in terms of the total number of faults, t, concurrently in the system. We
do not address the various combinations of sequential and coincident node faults that
could result in t faulty nodes. For simplicity, we present a limited version of the CFEM.
The full CFEM scenarios are more Kexible than those described below, because they
also permit the minimum number of good nodes required for system operation to be
speci.ed. For example, as described below, both benign fault scenarios require N ¿
t+1 nodes to tolerate t benign faults. A more detailed treatment of the CFEM scenarios
gives N ¿ t + B + 1, where B is .xed according to the minimum number of nodes
permitted in an operating system. Comparable parameters S and A are de.ned for
CFEMS and CFEMA. However, the minimum values of these parameters are adopted
in the remainder of this section. Having de.ned single fault-type and CFEM scenarios,
we next compare the numbers and types of faults tolerated by each. The combined
results appear in Table 5. Since the classi.cation of faults under the CFEM scenarios
depends on the fault detection and masking methods implemented in the system, there is
potential for improved system reliability using fault transformation. Fault transformation
can be done by adding detection methods, as well as by the addition of extra nodes.
The minimum number of nodes required to maintain correct operation in the presence
of a given number of faults is called the resiliency of the system. The fault set and
detection algorithms corresponding to CFEMB of the hybrid model are identical to
those of the benign fault set B; therefore, they share the same resiliency. However,
both CFEMS and CFEMA di0er in resiliency from CS and CA, because their covered
fault sets di0er.
3.2. Classic benign (CB) and CFEM benign (CFEMB) fault scenarios
In these scenarios, the only fault-tolerance functions implemented are error detection
mechanisms. Thus, under the CFEM, the set of covered faults is B, i.e., the set of
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Table 1
Fault resiliency under the symmetric fault scenario CS
fS 0 1 2 3 4 5
NS 2 3; 4 5; 6 7; 8 9; 10 11; 12
faults which can be detected by each nodes. Any faults which cannot be detected by
those algorithms are, by de.nition, intolerable. Suppose all good nodes either detect
an error in a message sent by a faulty node, or fail to receive an expected mes-
sage. All nodes adopt the prede.ned default value as their local value for that node,
and will thus agree on the fault status of the sender, without any further exchange
of information. In this case, the fault is benign, because all good nodes can detect
its occurrence. Thus, all local views are consistent with the global view. This is the
behavior assumed in both the classic single fault-type scenario, CB, and the CFEM
benign scenario, CFEMB. Both scenarios assume perfect coverage to all faults in B,
with N ¿ t + 1 nodes required to detect t faults in B. The only di0erence between
these scenarios is in the default value adopted when a faulty node is detected. Under
CFEMB, the adoption of a default value, E, distinguishable from a correct value, when
a message error is detected, allows that value to be ignored in future computations. The
potentially correct or boundary default value adopted under CB may skew future com-
putations. Note that system failure may occur if a malicious value or a catastrophic fault
occurs.
Under CFEMB, all faults in B are covered. CFEM-based active redundancy al-
gorithms and at least NB nodes are required to tolerate fB benign faults, where
NB=fB+(B+1). The parameter B is a .xed index, dependent upon the desired fault
coverage, where (1+ B) is the minimum number of nodes required for the system to
remain operational.
3.3. Classic symmetric (CS) and CFEM symmetric (CFEMS) scenarios
To handle symmetric malicious faults in CS, the established results appearing in
literature necessitate NS=2fS+1 as the minimum number of nodes required to tolerate
fS symmetric faults. So, the resiliency of a system using this fault model (and an
appropriate non-iterative passive redundancy algorithm) is given by NS, with all faults
treated as if they were symmetric malicious faults. A system with three or four nodes
can tolerate at most a single fault. A system with .ve or six nodes can tolerate at most
two faults. Table 1 summarizes the resiliency for di0erent values of NS.
For the CFEM, faults in B∪S are covered using hybrid non-iterative passive re-
dundancy algorithms. At least NS=(fB+fS)+ (S+1) nodes are needed to tolerate
(fB+fS) faults, where Smax = (NS−1)=2 and fS 6Smax. If operation in the pres-
ence of only one non-faulty node is possible, then S=Smax. Otherwise, S ¿Smax
if at least (S + 1) good nodes are required.
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Table 2
Fault resiliency under CFEMS. Unlike Table 1, the combination
of fB and fS tolerated by a given N (table entries) are indicated
fS 0 1 2 3 4
fB
0 3 5 7 9
1 2 4 6 8 10
2 3 5 7 9 11
3 4 6 8 10 12
4 5 7 9 11 13
5 6 8 10 12 14
Table 3




1 1 4; 5; 6
2 2 7; 8; 9
3 3 10; 11; 12
Under CFEMS, not all faults are assumed to be the worst case symmetric malicious
faults; so, a system using this model and the appropriate CFEM fault-tolerant voting
functions (Section 4) will tolerate more faults than the previous model. We have NS,
given by NS=2fS +fB +1. A set of three nodes can now tolerate either two benign
faults or a single symmetric malicious fault. Four nodes can tolerate three benign faults
or one symmetric malicious fault and one benign fault. The resiliency NS is given in
Table 2, with the entry corresponding to row fB and column fS giving the number of
nodes (NS) needed to tolerate fS symmetric malicious and fB benign faults.
3.4. Classic arbitrary (CA) and CFEM arbitrary (CFEMA) fault scenarios
Under the assumption of all arbitrary faults in CA, we have NA=3fA + 1 as the
resiliency for fA faults in A. A minimum of four nodes is required to tolerate a single
fault with a single rebroadcast round (r=1). Seven nodes and an additional round of
rebroadcast (r=2) are required to tolerate two faults, and so on. Thus, there is no
bene.t under this model to adding an additional node above the minimum, because
no more faults can be tolerated by adding only one node. In fact, the overall system
reliability will decrease, because there are more nodes which can fail. Increasing r
increases the number of messages which need to be exchanged exponentially. Table 3
depicts the number of faults tolerated by a given number of nodes for given values
of r.
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Table 4
Fault resiliency of a CFEM system under CFEMA. For a given node size N (table entries), the X and Y
co-ordinates combine to depict the combination of fB + fS + fA tolerated under CFEM
r=1
fA =0 fA =1
fS =0 fS =1 fS =2 fS =3 fS =0 fS =1 fS =2 fS =3
fB =0 4 6 8 4 6 8 10
fB =1 3 5 7 9 5 7 9 11
fB =2 4 6 8 10 6 8 10 12
fB =3 5 7 9 11 7 9 11 13
fB =4 6 8 10 12 8 10 12 14
fB =5 7 9 11 13 9 11 13 15
fB =6 8 10 12 14 10 12 14 16
For the CFEM, the fault set is B∪S∪A; so, all possible CFEM faults are covered.
A minimum of NA=(2fA+2fS+fB+A+1) nodes is suMcient to tolerate (fA+fB+
fS) faults. The maximum number of faults in A that can be tolerated is Amax = (NA−
1)=3 with fA 6Amax, A ¿Amax, and at least (A + 1) good nodes assumed to be
necessary for the system to remain operational. If a consensus algorithm with r rounds
of rebroadcast is used, then the further restriction of fA 6 r is also necessary. For
interactive convergence, A=fA, i.e., A relates to r correspondingly.
Under the CFEM for CFEMA, using a CFEM based interactive consistency algorithm
such as HOM(r), we have NA=2fA +2fS +fB + r+1, as demonstrated in Table 4,
with NA for di0erent values of fB, fS and fA given by the corresponding table entry.
Increasing the number of processors without increasing r thus permits more benign and
symmetric malicious faults to be tolerated.
For interactive convergence algorithms, the resiliency under the usual arbitrary fault
model is identical to that shown in Table 3. Under CFEMA of the CFEM model, the
resiliency for interactive convergence algorithms is that shown in Table 4 for r=1.
Tables 5 and 6 summarize the composite fault-set resilience o0ered by the CFEM
for the various fault scenarios.
Unlike many existing fault models, the fault model scenarios presented in this chap-
ter explicitly de.ne the type and number of faults that can be tolerated by a sys-
tem satisfying a speci.c scenario, as well as the class of algorithms needed to tol-
erate those faults. The main di0erence between the CFEM and other fault models
is the inclusion of implementation information in designing a system’s fault han-
dling resources. A fault may manifest itself benignly in one system implementation,
while another system would view the fault as an asymmetric value fault. As we
shall see subsequently, the increased precision of the mixed fault-type view over
the single fault-type view helps provide a more realistic estimate of system’s
reliability.
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Table 5
Classical and CFEM covered faults (the fault tuples are represented as (fB ; fS; fA))
Nodes(N ) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
CB 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CS 1 1 2 2 3 3
CA 1 1 1 2 2
CFEMS (6 2; 0; 0) (6 3; 0; 0) (6 4; 0; 0) (6 5; 0; 0) (6 6; 0; 0) (6 7; 0; 0)
(0; 1; 0) (1; 1; 0) (6 2; 1; 0) (6 3; 1; 0) (6 4; 1; 0) (6 5; 1; 0)
(0; 1; 0) (0;6 2; 0) (1; 2; 0) (2; 2; 0) (6 3; 2; 0)
(1; 2; 0) (1; 3; 0)
(0;6 3; 0)
CFEMA (6 2; 0; 0) (6 3; 0; 0) (6 4; 0; 0) (6 4; 0; 0) (6 5; 0; 0)
(0; 0; 1) (1; 1; 0) (6 2; 1; 0) (6 2; 1; 0) (6 3; 1; 0)
(0; 1; 0) (1; 0; 1) (6 2; 0; 1) (6 2; 0; 1) (6 3; 0; 1)
(0; 1; 0) (0;6 2; 0) (0;6 2; 0) (1; 2; 0)





Attributes of N -node systems under classic and CFEM assumptions
Scenario Assumed Redundancy Caveat
coverage
CB B N ¿ fB + 1 f∈ (A∪S) not covered
CS S∪BS N ¿ 2fS + 1 f∈ (BA ∪A) not covered
CA A∪S∪B N ¿ 3fA + 1 Multiple rounds of messages
needed
CFEMB B N ¿ fB + 1 f∈ (S∪A) not covered
CFEMS B∪S N ¿ fB + 2fS + 1 f∈A not covered
CFEMA A∪S∪B N ¿ fB + 2fS + 3fA + 1 Multiple rounds of messages
needed
4. Utilizing CFEM: (a) fault tolerant voting functions
So far, we have shown the Kexibility of the CFEM in being able to handle sets
of fault-e0ects of varying fault severity as compared to existing .xed fault-severity
models. However, before we can actually utilize the CFEM facets in the system op-
erations, we need to systematically develop voting functions and algorithms which
can support the CFEM. Fortunately, most of the existing techniques developed to
mask or to detect faults in redundant resources or components can be directly mod-
i.ed to take advantage of CFEM. We focus on forward-recovery methods which
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are designed to ensure continual service in the presence of a limited number of
faulty nodes. When combined with the appropriate system assumptions, each of the
techniques described below can be the basis for some consistency or convergence
operation.
Under the CFEM, each incoming message received by a node is examined for po-
tential faults by some set of detection mechanisms. Such mechanisms include sanity
checks, formatting checks, and error detection codes. If no discrepancies are detected
in a message, the message contents may be correct or a malicious fault-e0ect may be
present, or an intolerable (uncovered) fault-e0ect may have occurred. At the local node
level, no further fault type discrimination is possible.
If an error is detected, such as a framing, parity, or encoding fault, a missing mes-
sage, or a range violation, then we adopt a default error or status value, E, as the
sending node’s value. Under no circumstances can E be an acceptable value, and it
may di0er based on the data types of correct values or on the type of algorithm in
which the information is to be used. Without loss of generality, we assume that the
value E is greater than any permitted numerical data value.
Since each node performs local detection only, the adoption of E as a value means
that a faulty node with locally benign e0ects was detected. The detected fault could be
a benign fault, with all good nodes adopting E for that sender’s message. Or, it could
be an asymmetric malicious fault that sent detectably erroneous messages to some, but
not all, good nodes. Since the number of E values adopted by two good nodes can
legitimately di0er, standard fault masking algorithms must be extended. If no nodes
adopt the default error value, E, then the redundancy algorithms revert to the classic
single fault models.
4.1. Fault handling under the CFEM: voting functions
Voting functions which support CFEM have the generic structure of .ltering speci.ed
numbers of error-status values, E, to yield a consistent voted value. Thus, standard fault
tolerant voting functions, such as the majority or median, are extended to accommodate
Customizable Fault=Error by applying an exclusion function to the data value set prior
to voting. We do mention that our intent here is to detail the CFEM variations of the
voting functions; the application of these voting functions is discussed in Section 5
dealing with hybrid algorithms.
We .rst de.ne the .ltering function exclude(V ), which takes a set V of N elements,
{v1; v2; : : : ; vN}, removes any error values, E, from V , and returns the set (V − E),
containing (N − NE) elements. NE represents the number of discerned E values. In
the absence of benign faults (fB=0), no elements are excluded from the vote. The
subsequent CFEM voting functions are based on the exclude() function. Note that the
functions in these sections are not suMcient to mask faults in A which require iterative
algorithms such as the approximate agreement functions described later in Section 5. If
an (uncovered) asymmetric malicious fault occurs, all good nodes might not compute
consistent values, and system failure could result.
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4.2. CFEM majority vote
A majority vote is typically used by each good node to compute a common .nal
value for bimodal values received from other nodes or input sources. For N de.ned
as (N − NE), the CFEM majority(V ) is given by
majority(exclude(V )) =
{
v if more than (N−1)=2 of the vi = v;
E otherwise:
The default value, E, is returned when no majority exists, and must be de.ned a
priori and must be a potentially correct value, to avoid introducing a fault into a fault-
free scenario. Since the majority function ignores (N−1)=2 elements, the composite
function will be able to tolerate up to f faults, where f=fB + (N − NE)− 12.
4.3. CFEM mean and midpoint
The functions mean and midpoint are commonly used to average numerical data. The
mean of n values vi ∈V , for i∈{1; : : : ; n}, is mean(V )= 1=n
∑n
i=1 vi: The midpoint of n
values vi ∈V , for i∈{1; : : : ; n}, is the mean of extrema, with midpoint(V )= 12 (mini=1; n
(vi) + maxi=1;n (vi)), often called the mean of medial extremes or MME. Since these
functions are sensitive to extremal values, fault-tolerant versions are de.ned using the
reduce function, where, if V is a set of values to be voted on, 2t extremal values need
to be removed [6], i.e.,
reduce(V; t) = {V} − {the t largest and t smallest vi}:
The CFEM fault tolerant mean and CFEM fault tolerant MME functions apply the
mean and midpoint functions to restricted subsets of values, where the restriction .rst
removes the E values from detected benign faults, then eliminates the extrema from
the remaining elements using the reduce function, as de.ned in [6]. The number of
extrema eliminated now depends on N=N − NE, the number of elements remaining
after removing the fB benign fault values E.
CFEM fault tolerant mean(V ) = mean(reduce(exclude(V ); f(N)));
CFEM fault tolerant MME(V ) = midpoint(reduce(exclude(V ); f(N)))
with f(N)= ((N − NE) − 1)=2. Each function tolerates a total of f=fB + f(N)
faulty elements. However, as nE varies with the particular fault-set instantiation, i.e.,
# of faults fB is not .xed, the value of the t assumed by the reduce functions is not
.xed. Thus, the number of items to be reduced by the reduce function is a based on
a run-time calculation of N.
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4.4. CFEM median
The CFEM median consists of the median() applied after the exclude() function.
For a set V of m ordered values {v1; v2; : : : ; vn}, where vq 6 vq+1;




where i=1 + k, j=mE − k, and k = (N − NE − 1)=2. Since vq 6 E by de.nition,
the excluded values E will be the fB largest values. So, the elements remaining in VE
after application of the exclude function will be {v1; v2; : : : ; vN−NE}:
5. Utilizing CFEM: convergence and consensus functions
At this stage we have developed the CFEM fault scenarios and the associated prim-
itives of fault tolerant voting functions that are supported under the CFEM. We now
switch to developing the functions of distributed consensus and convergence that are
essentially utilized in providing for dependable services in generic synchronous dis-
tributed systems. Our intent here is to demonstrate that the CFEM can directly provide
for consensus and convergence operations which are Kexible in terms of (a) covering
combinations of fault types, and (b) are not restricted by the classical assumptions of
each node possessing identical number of data elements. The latter property allows for
these functions to provide additional Kexibility of fault handling in real, multiple fault
scenarios.
When the system is required to tolerate at least one arbitrary node fault, interactive
versions of the previous fault masking algorithms are required. In this section, CFEM
versions of iterative algorithms needed to ensure consensus or convergence under the
assumption of arbitrary fault e0ects are derived. In these algorithms, each node has an
initial value which it transmits to all other nodes. Each node adopts a .nal value based
on the values of all other nodes.
To ensure dependability, fault-free nodes are expected to make decisions and com-
pute values consistent with those of other good nodes, based on information received
in the messages from other nodes. Intuitively, the only condition necessary for the
system to operate correctly is for good nodes to make consistent decisions or to com-
pute the same value (or values guaranteed to be arbitrarily close). The system fails
when consistent decisions or computations across the system are no longer possible.
That is, some type of consensus conditions, similar to those given in Table 7, must
be satis.ed to guarantee that good nodes will make consistent decisions or compute
consistent values. While there are many variations possible in stating the conditions
needed to achieve exact agreement or approximate agreement among distributed nodes
[2, 6, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18–20], the requirements for consensus (CS) and convergence
(CV) given in Table 7 are suMciently general for our purposes.
Critical system functions must employ algorithms that achieve speci.ed agreement
conditions in all good nodes in the presence of faulty resources. Fault detection and
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Table 7
Consensus and convergence conditions
CS: Consensus conditions
EA (Exact agreement): All good nodes will agree on the value received from the sending node.
EV (Validity): If the sending node is non-faulty, then the value used by the receiving node corresponds
to the sending node’s value.
CV: Convergence conditions
AA (Approximate agreement): All good nodes’ .nal values will be within a prede.ned range of each
other.
AV (Validity): The .nal value of any non-faulty node is in the range of the initial values of all other
good nodes. Value used by the receiving node corresponds to the sending nodes value.
masking techniques developed for other fault assumptions are integrated with the CFEM
to enhance their resilience to faults. System reliability estimates are then based on
the relative occurrence probabilities of di0erent fault e0ects and their impact on the
consensus operation. Note that the behavior of a faulty node is not constrained by this
de.nition. Furthermore, if the sending node is faulty, it does not matter what decision
is reached by the good nodes regarding the faulty node’s value, as long as they all
agree. Third, good nodes are not required to recognize which nodes are faulty.
5.1. Consensus under CFEM
The hybrid oral messages (HOM) algorithm, 6 presented in Table 8 is an extension
to the oral messages (OM) algorithm of Lamport, et al. [9], which can be proven to
satisfy the consensus conditions EA and EV from Table 7 when certain conditions
regarding the number and types of faults are met. Algorithm HOM di0ers from OM
algorithm, as it must deal with values corresponding to detected node faults.
Algorithm HOM(r) assumes a .xed number of rebroadcast rounds, r, with fA 6 r.
While detected node faults will yield E values, a malicious fault can take on any value
in W , where W is the set of potentially correct values, without violating a range check.
The function HOM maj(V ), employed by HOM(r), computes a consistent value from
set of V The values in V can be a combination of correct values from W , incorrect
values from W , and values from the default error value set.
Within the algorithm, the value E is adopted when an obviously incorrect value or
no value is received from some node, say i, by another node, k. A node participating
in HOM(r) may then need to indicate to node j that it recognized a fault in the
original sender. However, since E is de.ned such that no good node can send it
as a correct value, the second receiving node will assume that node k is faulty if
it receives E from it, even though the E value is due to node i begin faulty. To
remove this ambiguity, the value R(E) is sent when a node recognizes an error in a
6 Variants of this algorithm have appeared earlier in [11, 20].
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Table 8
Algorithm HOM
(Hybrid oral messages) HOM(r):
S1: The Transmitter sends its personal value, v, to all receivers.
S2: For each i, let vi denote the value that Receiver i gets from the Transmitter.
If r=0, and either no value or an obviously incorrect value (out of range, failed check sum, etc.) is
received, Receiver i adopts E.
Otherwise, Receiver i adopts vi . The algorithm then terminates.
If r¿0, each Receiver adopts R(E), if an obviously incorrect or no value is received, and R(vi) other-
wise. Each receiver then acts as the Transmitter in Algorithm HOM(r − 1) sending its personal value
to the other N − 2 nodes.
S3: For each i and j, with i = j, let vj denote the value Receiver i gets from sender j in S2 of HOM(r−1).
If no message is received or vj is obviously incorrect (If the value Rk (E) is received, where k ¿ r− l
in S2 HOM(r−l), then that too is recognized as an error, and E should be adopted). Receiver i adopts
E for vj ; otherwise, vj is used.
Since all Receivers act as senders in HOM(r− 1), each Receiver will have a vector containing (N− 1)
values at the end of HOM(r−1). Receiver i adopts v=HOM maj(v1; v2; : : : ; vN−1) as the Transmitter’s
value.
message it receives. When r¿1 and a¿0, R2(E)≡R(R(E)) is adopted and sent when
a node receives R(E) from the transmitter, R3(E)≡R(R(R(E))) is adopted and sent
upon receipt of R2(E) from the transmitter, and so on. If the power k of Rk(E) received
by a node exceeds r, then the value is erroneous, and E should be substituted. The
use of the R() operator to enclose E also prevents information from good nodes from
being ignored when the E values are excluded in HOM maj below. Thus, the default
error set is extended to include (r) distinct error values, {E; R(E); R2(E); : : : ; Rr(E)},
where R0(E)≡E, R2(E)≡R(R(E)), etc. The operator R() applied to a value, such as E,
indicates that the sender of R(E) detected a locally benign fault in a message it received,
and adopted R(E). For any value x∈W , R(x)= x. The inverse of the R operator, R−1 is
also de.ned, with R−1(R(E))=E, R−1(Rk(E))=Rk−1(E), and R−1(x)= x for x∈W .
These additional values are needed to prevent a good node from being viewed as faulty
for passing on a message from a faulty transmitting node.
The function HOM maj is similar to the CFEM majority function de.ned earlier,
except that it recognizes elements from the extended error value set {R(E); : : : ; Rr(E)}
as acceptable values. Given a set V of k values, vi; : : : ; vk , HOM maj(V ) is given by
HOM maj(V ) =


E if all of the vi satisfy vi = E;
R−1(vE) if vE = majority(exclude(V )) exists; otherwise;
v0 where v0 is a functionally determined value:
The provision which assumes E if all the vi are E cannot occur on a good node. It
is included to provide a fail safe default value should that case occurs on a partially
faulty node. In [21], we prove that for any r¿0, any fA6r, any fS¿0, and any
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Table 9
A CFEM algorithm CV for achieving convergence
Let f=fA + fS + fB be the number of faulty nodes present during a round of algorithm execution, with
N¿2fA +2fS +fB + A1, where fA6Amax, fA ∈A, fS ∈S, fB ∈B, and Amax = (N − 1)=3. Let the
function g be either gA =CFEM fault tolerant mean or gM =CFEM fault tolerant MME . At each round,
each non-faulty node p performs the following steps.
S1: Node p broadcasts its current value vp to all nodes, including itself.
S2: Node p collects all values sent to it during that round into the extended multiset Vp. If p does not
receive a feasible value vq from each node q, or receives no value from node q, it adopts the value E.
S3: Node p excludes all error values E from Vp, giving Up = exclude(Vp).
S4: Node p computes its new value, v′ = g(Up).
fB¿0, Algorithm HOM(r) satis.es EA and EV for ¿2fA + 2fS + fB + r + 1. A
similar, mechanically veri.ed, proof of this algorithm appears in [11].
5.2. Convergence under CFEM
As discussed previously, interactive convergence has been achieved if conditions AA
and AV in Table 7 are satis.ed. In Table 9 we now describe the (non-terminating)
synchronous convergence algorithm applicable under CFEM. A related asynchronous
algorithm also appears in [2]. Furthermore, the discussion of termination in [6] can
then be applied under this framework, using the HOM algorithm.
Before addressing the convergence properties of the CFEM convergence algorithm,
we point out major di0erences between this algorithm and the corresponding algorithms
in [6, 22]. Nodes p and q may receive di0erent values from asymmetrically faulty
nodes. Thus, they may identify di0erent numbers of faults as being in B, and the sizes
of the sets Up and Uq need not be identical. The values of f, fB, fS, and fA are .xed
globally for a given execution of the algorithm. However, the non-faulty nodes p and
q are only required to compute consistent values in the presence of t faults, at most
Amax of which are in A. They are not required to agree on the global diagnosis of
di0erent numbers and types of faults.
Also, while t is .xed in other algorithms, the number of faults tolerated by Algorithm
CV varies with the numbers of faults of di0erent types. Once the values of nmax and
A have been chosen for the scenario, all combinations of fA, fS, and fB faults that
satisfy the scenario CFEMA assumptions of nmax¿2fA + 2fS + fB + A + 1, with
fA6Amax, must be accommodated.
The following theorem states the convergence properties of Algorithm CV .
Theorem 1. Let nmax¿2fA+2fS+fB+A+1; whereAmax = (nmax−1)=3; fA6Amax;
and A¿Amax. Let P be a synchronous approximation protocol in which each node
executes Algorithm CV . Suppose that T ⊆ S is a set of nodes; with ‖T‖¿nmax − t;
and t=fA + fS + fB is the number of faulty nodes present during the execution of
round k of Algorithm CV .
1244 C.J. Walter, N. Suri / Theoretical Computer Science 290 (2003) 1223–1251
Let C be a sequence of iterations or rounds of P; and let k be a round number.
Let U be the multiset of values held by nodes in T immediately before round k in
C; and let U ′ be the multiset of values held by nodes in T immediately after round
k in C. Then;
(1) If g= gM ; then )(U ′)6)(U )=2; where )(U ′)= max(U ′)−min(U ′).
(2) If g= gA; then )(U ′)6t)(U )=(nmax − 2t).
(3) If g= gA or g= gM ; *(U ′)⊆ *(U ); where *(U ′)= [min(U ′);max(U ′)].
The complete proof of this theorem is provided in the Appendix section. Basically the
theorem demonstrates that the range of values of non-faulty nodes decreases in each
round by a factor dependent upon the function g employed in the CFEM convergence
algorithm. Thus, the algorithm will eventually converge, proving AA, with AV applying
at the end of each round. The termination properties of this algorithm, discussed in
[6], remain unchanged, except that a CFEM interactive consistency algorithm needs
to be employed to achieve consistent agreement on termination. Existing interactive
convergence algorithms, such as those in Welch and Lynch [22] and MAFT [8], can
also incorporate the CFEM fault taxonomy. A similar result has been derived for the
asynchronous interactive convergence algorithm [2].
These interactive methods represent but a subset of the algorithms that need to
be reexamined under the assumption of CFEM faults. The exclusion of error (E)
values prior to application of a value selection function is relatively straightforward for
non-iterative passive redundancy techniques. However, the impact of exclusion upon
interactive consistency and convergence algorithms is more subtle, as evidenced by
the diMculties experienced in devising a correct CFEM algorithm that can achieve the
consensus conditions. The ability of asymmetric malicious faults to appear as locally
benign faults makes many of the interactive single-fault algorithms invalid because the
exclusion of E values may result in di0erent nodes having di0erent numbers of values
to vote on to achieve the .nal value.
6. Summary
In this chapter, we have presented the CFEM, in which faults are classi.ed based
on their e0ects upon the system and upon the fault handling techniques implemented
in the system. Extending beyond the .xed fault severity models (time-domain and
data-domain, s-a-X, Byzantine faults), the CFEM framework permits handling a con-
tinuum of fault types as groups of faults of di0ering fault manifestations under a single
algorithmic paradigm.
The diMculties in classifying faults by attributes, independent of the system imple-
mentation, application and environment, highlighted the need for a fault taxonomy that
captured system-dependent e0ects. The fault e0ects taxonomy (CFEM), which parti-
tions all faults into tolerable and intolerable faults, addresses the need for a di0erent
type of fault classi.cation. Having provided the CFEM and algorithms, hybrid fault
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model scenarios were de.ned, to combine the covered hybrid fault classes with the
algorithms needed to tolerate them. The potential for fault transformation by adding
more detection mechanisms, modifying the speci.ed fault scenario, or increasing the
node redundancy was also explored.
An important consideration in achieving the full bene.t of our hybrid CFEM fault
theory in real systems is the lack of existing experience in identifying and tolerat-
ing mixed fault types and fault combinations. Many researchers have stated that be-
nign faults are more probable than symmetric value faults, which are more probable
than asymmetric or Byzantine value faults. While anecdotal evidence of the presence
of arbitrarily malicious failures exists, there is still disagreement regarding how best
to protect against them, if at all possible. As the statistics of probability of occur-
rence of various fault types are better documented, the utility of the CFEM increases
correspondingly.
The CFEM approach discussed here is currently being applied to a new archi-
tecture solving a real world problem. The architecture for a ship control system is
being developed using these concepts. The results have been very encouraging and
have demonstrated e0ectiveness to date during the development stage. The full util-
ity of the approach will continue to be explored as the project progresses. The abil-
ity to clearly formulate and test relationships, both of dependence and independence,
has been very useful in verifying and validating aspects of the architecture. A cur-
rent research goal is to continue to compile existing digital system experience and
to develop new error extraction guidelines and fault analysis techniques. This in-
cludes assessment of the e0ectiveness of existing fault detection and error logging
methods.
Overall we have shown that a more precise dependability model can be constructed,
supported by on-line diagnosis algorithms under a generalized hybrid fault model. We
believe the integration of hybrid CFEM fault theory into digital system design and
validation will provide a greater understanding of fault e0ects and the risks associated
with uncovered faults.
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Appendix A.
The proof of Theorem 1 is detailed below. We .rst present the multiset terminology
and subsequently develop the proof.
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A.1. Terminology
Our notation and de.nitions are similar to those used in [6]. The notation and con-
cepts used in [22] are also developed from [6]. Let the .nite multiset U of real numbers
be a function U :R→N , which is nonzero on at most .nitely many r ∈R. The function
U assigns a .nite multiplicity to each value r ∈R. The cardinality of multiset U is
given by
∑
r∈R U (r), and denoted by ‖U‖. A multiset is empty if its cardinality is
zero. The di0erence of multisets, V − U , is a multiset W , de.ned by
W (r) =
{
V (r)− U (r) if U (r)− V (r)¿ 0;
0 otherwise:
The intersection U ∩V of multisets U and V is the multiset W de.ned by
W (r) = min(U (r); V (r)):
The minimum of a non-empty multiset U , min(U ) is de.ned by
min(U ) = min{r ∈ R|U (r) = 0}
with the maximum, max(U ), de.ned similarly. We denote the closed interval [min(U );
max(U )] by *(U ), and let )(U ) be the length of that interval, with
)(U ) = max(U )−min(U ):
The mean of the multiset U is de.ned by mean(U )=
∑
r∈R r·U (r)=‖U‖. The midpoint
of the multiset U is de.ned by mid(U )= [max(U ) + min(U )]=2. If U is a nonempty
multiset, we de.ne the multiset s(U ), obtained by removing one occurrence of the
smallest value in U , to be the multiset W (r) de.ned by
W (r) =
{
U (r) if r = min(U );
U (r)− 1 otherwise:
The multiset l(U ), in which one occurrence of the largest value in U is removed, is
de.ned similarly. If we assume t is a .xed, non-negative integer, then if ‖U‖¿2t, we
can compute reduce(U; t)= st(lt(U )).
We next formally de.ne the hybrid midpoint and hybrid mean functions in forms
appropriate for this discussion. Let U be a .nite multiset, and W be a .nite multiset
over a set Q disjoint from the reals (R∩Q= ∅), with W (q)= 0 everywhere in Q
except at vB ∈Q. 7 The extended multiset V is then given by V =U ∪W . We de.ne
the fault-tolerant midpoint function gM to be gM (U )=mid(reduce(U; t)). Similarly, the
fault mean or averaging function gA is given by gA(U )=mean(reduce(U; t)). Then, the
hybrid fault-tolerant midpoint or hybrid MME is de.ned by
hfM (V ) ≡ gM (exclude(V )) ≡ gM (U ):
7 The default error value vB should be treated as if it were not a real number, as it must be distinguishable
from all potentially correct values.
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Similarly, we de.ne the hybrid fault-tolerant mean as
hfA(V ) ≡ gA(exclude(V )) ≡ gA(U ):
A.2. Essential lemmas
The proof of Theorem requires the following lemmas, adapted from [6], under the
assumption that not all nodes vote on the same number of values. For completeness,
all lemmas are stated, but proofs are provided only when they di0er vastly from those
in [6].
The .rst lemma shows that the number of elements common to two non-empty
multisets is reduced by at most 1 when either the smallest or the largest element is
removed from each.
Lemma 1. Suppose that V and W are non-empty multisets. Then;
(1) ‖V ∩W‖ − ‖s(V )∩ s(W )‖61.
(2) ‖V ∩W‖ − ‖l(V )∩ l(W )‖61.
The next lemma extends Lemma 1 to removing di0erent numbers of extremal values
from two multisets of potentially di0erent sizes. We adopt the notation tv ≡ t(V ),
where tv6min(Amax; (nv − A − 1)=2), the maximum number of faults not in B
that can be tolerated by nv ≡ ‖V‖ nodes under our assumptions, as derived for the
reliability results in [16].
Lemma 2. Suppose V and W are two multisets with |V |¿2tv and |W |¿2tw; where
tv6t and tw6t. Then;
|V ∩W | − |reduce(V; tv) ∩ reduce(V; tw)|6 2max(tv; tw):
Proof. Applying Lemma 1, we have
‖V ∩W‖ − ‖reduce(V;min(tv; tw)) ∪ reduce(W;min(tv; tw))‖6 2(min(tv; tw)):
Without loss of generality, assume tv¿tw. Then, by Lemma 1, removal of the remaining
tv − tw smallest and largest values from V complete the result.
The proofs in [6] apply to the next pair of lemmas, except that we use tv to indicate
that the lemmas do not assume the global t value of the algorithm. Instead, the lemmas
are valid for the maximum number of faults in S∪A that the (local) multiset of size
‖V‖ can tolerate under our assumptions.
Lemma 3. Suppose that k is a non-negative integer; and U and V are non-empty
multisets with ‖V − U‖6ktv; and ‖V‖¿2ktv. Then;
*(reducek(V; tv)) ⊆ *(U ):
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Lemma 4. Suppose that U and V are nonempty multisets such that ‖U −V‖6tv and
‖V‖¿2tv. Then; gM (V )∈ *(U ).
Lemma 5 illustrates the value of the midpoint function in approximation. While
the proof is identical to that in [6], the implications of this lemma di0er because the
multisets M and N need not have the same cardinality.
Lemma 5. Let U; M; and N be non-empty multisets with ‖M ∩N‖¿0; *(M)⊆ *(U );
and *(N )⊆ *(U ). Then;
‖mid(M)− mid(N )‖6 )(U )=2:
The following lemma provides the main result for the midpoint function.
Lemma 6. Let U; V; and W be non-empty multisets; with ‖V−U‖6tv; ‖W−U‖6tw;
and ‖V ∩W‖¿2max(tv; tw). Then;
‖gM (V )− gM (W )‖6 )(U )=2:
Proof. Let M = reduce(V; tv) and N = reduce(W; tw). By Lemma 2,
‖M ∩ N‖¿ ‖V ∩W‖ − 2max(tv; tw);
and, by hypothesis, ‖M ∩N‖¿0. By Lemma 3, with k =1, *(M)⊆ *(U ) and *(N )⊆ *
(U ). Applying Lemma 5 yields the result.
The next three lemmas provide results for the mean function comparable to those
for the midpoint.
Lemma 7. Let U and V be non-empty multisets such that ‖V −U‖6t and ‖V‖¿2tv.
Then gA(V )∈ *(U ).
Lemma 8. Let U;M; and N be nonempty multisets; and m; n; and i be nonnegative
integers such that ‖M‖=m; ‖N‖= n; ‖M ∩N‖¿i; *(M)⊆ *(U ); and *(N )⊆ *(U ).
Then;
‖mean(N )− mean(M)‖6 )(U )max(m; n)− i
max(m; n)
: (1)
Proof. The result holds when m= n by Lemma 8 of [6]. It remains to prove for m = n.
Let L=M ∩N , M ′=M − L, and N ′=N − L. Then, we have
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max(M)(m− ‖L‖)−min(N )(n− ‖L‖)
n
: (5)
From expression (5), we can derive
max(M)(n− ‖L‖)−min(N )(n− ‖L‖)
n
(6)





Since we have n¿m, expression (7) is equivalent to the desired result. The argument










Lemma 9. Let U; V; and W be non-empty multisets; with ‖V‖= nv; ‖W‖= nw; ‖V
∩W‖¿i + 2max(tv; tw); ‖V − U‖6tv; and ‖W − U‖6tw. Then;
‖gA(V )− gA(W )‖6 )(U )max(m; n)− imax(m; n) : (8)
Proof. Let M = reduce(V; tv), m= nv − 2tv, N = reduce(W; tw) and n= nw − 2tw. By
Lemmas 2 and 3, the hypotheses of Lemma 8 are satis.ed, yielding the result.
Using these lemmas, we can now verify our main theorem.
A.3. Proof of Theorem 1
Let p and q be any two nodes in T . Let Vp be the initial multiset of values held
by p after the exclusion of nmax − np default error values vB, where ‖Vp‖= np and
tp= min(Amax; (np − A − 1)=2): Similarly, Vq is initial multiset of values held by
q after the exclusion of nmax − nq values vB, where ‖Vq‖= nq and tq= min(Amax;
1250 C.J. Walter, N. Suri / Theoretical Computer Science 290 (2003) 1223–1251
(nq − A − 1)=2): Since there are at most t faulty nodes, we have
‖Vp − U‖6 tp 6 t;
‖Vq − U‖6 tq 6 t:
Furthermore, since Vp and Vq contain identical entries from non-faulty nodes, we have
‖Vp ∩ Vq‖¿ n− t ¿ 2t ¿ 2 max(tp; tq):
(1) Sets U; Vp and Vq satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 6. Therefore,
‖gM (Vp)− gM (Vq)‖6 )(U )=2:
Since p and q were arbitrary, we are done.
(2) By de.nition (maxq∈T nq)6nmax and (maxq∈T tq)6t. Let i= nmax − 3t and m=
nmax−2t. Then, U , Vp and Vq satisfy the hypotheses of Lemma 9, and we conclude
that
‖gA(Vp)− gA(Vq)‖6 t)(U )=(nmax − 2t): (9)
Since p and q were arbitrary, the result follows.
(3) Multisets U and Vp satisfy the hypotheses of Lemmas 4 and 7. Therefore, gM (Vp)
∈ *(U ) and gA(Vp)∈ *(U ). Thus, ps value after round k is in *(U ). Since p was
arbitrary, all elements of U ′ are in *(U ).
Theorem 10. Algorithm CV achieves approximate agreement.
Proof. Theorem 1 shows that the range of values of non-faulty processes decreases
in each round by a factor dependent upon the function g employed in Algorithm CV .
Thus, the algorithm will eventually converge, proving Agreement. Part 3 of Theorem 1
applies at the end of each round, ensuring that the Validity condition is satis.ed.
As mentioned previously, the termination properties discussed in [6] remain un-
changed.
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